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Abstract 
Online market exchanges are usually characterized by uncertainty and risks. Establishing trust and 
providing trust-building mechanisms are thus crucial for marketplace providers to reduce uncertainty and 
risks of online transactions. Business models that focus on consumer-to-consumer (C2C) transactions are 
growing and prospering. For these business models, establishing trust between consumers is important. 
Research in e-Commerce has mainly focused on trust-building mechanisms between vendors and 
consumers, but did not pay as much attention to mechanisms to build trust between individual consumers 
on C2C platforms. The objective of this study is to empirically investigate and test trust-building 
mechanisms for C2C platforms using data from the e-Finance marketplace Prosper. Our results give 
empirical support that trust-building mechanisms such as structural assurances, economic and social cues, 
as well as content quality influence trusting behavior. We contribute to literature and practice by 
investigating trust building in C2C relationships. Our findings help online marketplace providers to build 
successful C2C platforms. 
 
Keywords: Community, C2C marketplace, e-Finance, trust 
 
Introduction 
The Web and Internet have created many possibilities for new business models. eBay, for example, an online auction 
marketplace for buying and selling products has successfully connected individual sellers and buyers around the globe. A 
specialized e-Commerce model that has more recently been created is a finance model which facilitates borrowing and 
lending between individuals on an electronic market. Prosper, for instance, is an online auction marketplace which functions 
similarly to eBay, however, instead of listing and bidding on items, people list and bid on loans using Prosper's platform. 
Business models that involve these kinds of C2C relationships have seemed to be growing and prospering. Transactions in 
online marketplace are routinely characterized by uncertainty and risk of opportunism due to the anonymous nature of online 
exchanges. Sufficient trust between individual sellers and buyers is thus critical to the existence of the market, and 
subsequently, the profitability of the market builder. 
 
In this "e-Finance" model, trust is arguably more important than in other e-Commerce models for a few reasons. First, lenders 
and borrowers usually get involved in a longer term relationship than sellers and buyers on markets of regular commodities 
because loans normally take a few years to pay off. Second, lenders usually risk more money in a loan than buyers in a 
common online transaction for things like books or even computers. For instance, on Prosper the average amount of loans is 
$5,026. Third, in an e-Finance market, funding is a scarce resource that the borrowers need to compete with each other to 
obtain. On Prosper, the borrower-to-lender ratio is approximately 3:1, whereas in other e-Commerce markets such as eBay 
and Amazon marketplace, the ratio of sellers-to-buyers will probably be higher. In addition, the average loan request on 
Prosper is $5,730, while the average bid is only $108. Given these reasons, lenders need to establish reasonable trust in the 
borrowers to be willing to risk their money. Conversely, it is important for the individual borrowers to provide credibility 
signals to differentiate themselves from others and give incentives to lenders to engage in trusting behavior (Ba and Pavlou 
2002). Consequently, a better understanding of trust behaviors and the mechanisms to develop trust is crucial to businesses 
that profit from e-Commerce models. Our research question is what trust-building mechanisms induce trusting behavior. 
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Our paper makes several contributions. First, we add to the knowledge of online trust behaviors on C2C platforms. Two, we 
purport and verify the importance of trust in an e-Finance environment. Third, we make suggestions about how trust can be 
enhanced in e-Commerce marketplaces. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, we introduce Prosper e-Finance business model. Then, we provide an 
overview of the trust literature and develop our research model that investigates the extent to which trust-building 
mechanisms influence trusting behavior. Subsequently, we use publicly available data from Prosper to test our research 
model and present our results. We conclude with a discussion about the results and limitations of the study. 
C2C Lending Platform Prosper.com  
An e-Finance Model 
Prosper is an online auction marketplace for people-to-people lending. Individuals who need a loan can post requests for 
loans (called listings) on Prosper’s Website, individuals who are willing to lend their money to earn interests will then make 
their bids by specifying the amount they want to lend and the interest rate by which they want to get paid. Prosper generates 
revenue by collecting a one-time 1% or 2% fee on funded loans from borrowers, and assessing a 0.5% or 1.0% annual loan 
servicing fee to lenders. As of February 14, 2007, it has attracted 180,185 registered members, supported 90,398 listings 
(7,404 completed, 42,678 expired, and 141 pending verification, 36,669 withdrawn, 707 cancelled, and 2799 active), 919,342 
bids, and generated 7,408 loans which altogether raised 37,234,040 dollars. The average amount of a loan is $5026. Prosper 
managed to attract many new members and enjoys exponential growth for members, listings, and bids. Since its first member 
registration on 10/31/2005, the average increase of new members has increased from 112 per month in 2005, to 11,231 per 
month in 2006, and 30,124 per month in 2007. In 2005, the average monthly new listings are 30, in 2006, this number is 
6,151, and in 2007, this number has reached 11,022. The average new bids per month is 236 in 2005, 54,849 in 2006, and 
173,789 in 2007. As of February 14, 2007, 40,390 members have posted a request for loan, 14,074 placed a bid for lending, 
and 13,453 generated loans. On average, there are 15 bids per listing of loan request. 
How it works 
A listing for a loan request remains open for certain days. During which bids for lending compete by the interest rates they 
ask. When it gets fully funded, a borrower may choose to complete the listing and get funded or keep the listing active (open) 
for lower interest rates. If a listing runs out of time and is not yet 100% funded, no loan will be created. Prosper encourages 
group and community building to develop trust between lenders and borrows and to facilitate borrowing and lending 
activities on Prosper. In addition, Prosper provides security and background check on borrowers. 
 
Prosper claims to create loans with lower interest rates than loans through banks due to the absence of services fees paid to 
banks. For personal loans on a 36 month term, the average borrower’s credit score and the average interest rates they got on 
Prosper are listed in the following table.  
 
Table 1. Credit grade and average interest rates 
Credit Grade Number of People Percentage Average Borrower Rate 
AA 656 8.86% 9.14% 
A 577 7.79% 11.07% 
B 762 10.29% 13.92% 
C 1074 14.50% 16.75% 
D 1182 15.96% 20.14% 
E 1432 19.33% 25.00% 
HR 1587 21.42% 24.26% 
NC 138 1.86% 22.44% 
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Borrowing and lending in communities is not a new phenomenon. However, the Internet supports lending on a much larger 
scale and can reach a worldwide audience. The advantage of C2C e-Finance is that it reduces the reliance on institutions such 
as banks to receive credit or interest. However, banks are able to provide insurance for borrowers and lenders that individuals 
may not be able to provide. Thus, trust in the individual borrower is important for C2C e-Finance marketplaces. In order to 
attract people, these marketplaces need to find mechanisms that facilitate trust between the borrowers and lenders. 
Trust 
Trust and trust-building mechanisms are important in e-Commerce because they can reduce the perceived uncertainty and 
risk associated with anonymous online exchanges (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Chen et al. 2004; Gefen et al. 2003; Pavlou and 
Gefen 2004). Despite its importance, there is yet no universally accepted definition of the concept trust (Chen and Dhillon 
2003; Rousseau et al. 1998). Recent studies rely on the theory of reasoned action (TRA) to conceptualize trust and suggest 
path models of trust formation (Appan and Mellarkod 2003; Gefen et al. 2003). TRA suggests that behavior is driven by 
behavior intentions that are influenced by one’s attitude towards performing the behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). 
Attitude is formed on the base of one’s beliefs about the consequences of performing the behavior and the desirability of the 
consequences. All other external factors influence attitudes, intentions, and behaviors through these beliefs. Taking TRA as a 
framework, we conceptualize trust as the willingness to depend based on the attitude and specific beliefs about the other party 
(McKnight et al. 2000; Rousseau et al. 1998). 
Trust-Building Mechanisms 
Trust is the product of many sources, and differences in these antecedents often depend on the stage of trust development (Ba 
and Pavlou 2002; McKnight et al. 1998). In this study, we focus on initial trust for several reasons. First, Prosper is a 
relatively new marketplace and its first member registered in October 2005. Thus we can not assume long-term interactions 
between members. Second, compared with eBay and Amazon marketplace, the number of transactions per member is smaller 
on Prosper. Out of the 7285 members with completed listings, only 117 members had multiple listings. Thus, familiarity 
between the members cannot be assumed. We are focusing on three sources of trust that have been shown to be relevant for 
initial trust development: institution-based trust, cognitive-based trust, and quality (McKnight et al. 2002; McKnight et al. 
1998). 
Trust Consequences 
Prior studies support that higher levels of trust are associated with higher trusting behavior (Pavlou and Gefen 2004). In our 
study, trusting behavior is represented by bidding to lend in response to listings. Bidding to lend indicates that the lender 










Trusting Beliefs Trusting Intentions
Trusting Behavior
- Likelihood of 
funding
Trusting Attitudes
Figure 1. Conceptual model  
 
In the next section, we develop our research model. Since we are relying on secondary data provided by Prosper we are not 
able to measure the trust constructs. Therefore, we focus on the external factors which lead to trust and the trusting behavior 
which are the consequences of trust. 
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Development of Research Model 
Institutional-Based Trust 
Structural assurance is one component of institutional-based trust and refers to one’s beliefs that a third party (i.e., in our 
context Prosper) provides structures such as guarantees and regulations which enhance the likelihood of a successful outcome 
(McKnight et al. 1998). Structural assurances work as signaling mechanisms and reduce uncertainty and risk. An important 
structural assurance Prosper offers is the verification of borrowers’ bank accounts that are used for automatic withdrawal of 
monthly payments of the loans. The existence of a verified bank account should increase trust and provide an incentive for 
lenders to bid for the loan. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The existence of a verified bank account increases the likelihood of funding. 
Cognitive Based Trust 
Cognitive-based trust is formed through first impressions based on categorization processes and illusions of control 
(McKnight et al. 1998). Individuals use categorization processes to assign person to groups and then deriving trusting beliefs 
from the group to the individual. Illusions of control describe how individuals assess trustworthiness by observing and 
watching for cues that confirm their initial belief about the party (McKnight et al. 1998). If lenders are not able to judge 
whether the borrower is able and willing to payback the loan, they may use peripheral cues to evaluate the trustworthiness of 
the borrower. Prior research looked at peripheral cues such as feedback ratings (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Chen et al. 2004), 
domain name (Hong 2006), identification of authors, or availability of author information (Shek et al. 2003). Prosper offers 
several opportunities for borrowers to provide information about themselves that signals credibility. 
Economic Cues derived from Borrower Information 
Availability of borrower information has the potential to decrease uncertainty and allows a lender to better evaluate the 
competence, integrity, and predictability of a borrower. Economic criteria such as credit grades, debt to income ratio, and 
homeownership are commonly used to estimate the ability and willingness of a borrower to pay back its loan in time. Lenders 
will take those criteria into account when considering whether to bid for a listing. Prosper obtains the credit score of each 
borrower from the credit bureau Experian. Conversely, Prosper reports payment and delinquency information back to 
Experian. Thus, lenders can infer borrowers’ accountability from their credit grades. Since payment performance on Prosper 
has consequences on the credit score, borrowers are interested in paying the loans on time. Higher credit grades thus should 
positively affect the likelihood of funding. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of funding increases with higher credit grades. 
 
Debt to income ratio gives information about the ability of a borrower to pay back additional debts. The higher the debt to 
income ratio, the less likely a lender will perceive a borrower to be able to pay back the loan, and therefore, the smaller the 
likelihood of funding. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of funding decreases with higher debt to income ratio. 
 
Homeownership might show lenders that the borrower is a responsible person and able to handle loans. The lender might thus 
place more trust in a borrower with homeownership. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Borrowers’ homeownership increases the likelihood of funding. 
Social Cues derived from the Social Environment of the Borrower 
Prosper provides the opportunity for its members to join groups which are organized and maintained by group leaders. 
Groups are evaluated based on the repayment history of loans associated with the group. Group members are thus interested 
to see that their fellow members fulfill their payment obligations. Hence, lenders might perceive listings associated with a 
group as more trustworthy than listings that are not associated with a group.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Group membership increases the likelihood of funding. 
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Each group receives a rating based on their members’ payment performance. Groups that outperform an expected default rate 
receive higher ratings. Lenders might infer from the group performance that of the individual borrowers who belong to the 
group. Lenders might also believe that group members will socially influence other group members to pay back their loans in 
order to maintain a high group rating. Hence, borrowers who belong to a group with a higher rating may be perceived as 
more trustworthy than those who belong to a group with a lower rating. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood of funding increases with higher group ratings. 
 
Group leaders are able to earn money if a listing associated with their group gets funded or repays on-time. This reward gives 
an incentive to the group to ensure that group members fulfill their payment obligations. This incentive is likely to be higher, 
the higher the reward rate is. A lender might thus place more trust in a group with higher group leader reward rates. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The likelihood of funding increases with higher group leader reward rates. 
 
Borrowers can invite other Prosper members to leave an endorsement on their listing to give the listing more credibility. A 
lender might perceive a borrower who has managed to obtain endorsements as more trustworthy because other members have 
shown trust in the borrower. It also shows that the borrower belongs to a social network which might lend additional 
credibility. Endorsements for listings might thus give the perception of trustworthiness. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Endorsements from other community members increase the likelihood of funding. 
Quality of Listing 
Quality has been studied as an antecedent to trust (Huerta and Ryan 2003; McKnight et al. 2002; Rieh and Belkin 1998). 
People derive their trust perception about whatever they know about the other person (McKnight et al. 1998). Thus, if lenders 
perceive a listing to be of high quality, they might associate positive attributes to the borrower which positively influence 
trust formation (McKnight et al. 2002). Hence, quality increases trust (Hong 2006; Huerta and Ryan 2003; McKnight et al. 
2002). 
 
Like trust, quality has been conceptualized in many different ways and no global definition exists (Reeves and Bednar 1994). 
Since we are using secondary data provided by Prosper, measuring quality as conformance to pre-defined specifications 
seems most appropriate. We used three quantitative measures – readability of listing description, formality of title, and 
availability of listing image – to investigate the influence of quality on trusting behavior. 
 
Quantitative readability scores such as Flesh Reading Ease test use formula to derive readability scores based on the number 
of words, sentences, and syllables. Higher scores indicate ease to read. Lenders might perceive listings that are easier to read 
as more attractive. Higher scores on the Flesch Reading Ease test might thus positively influence funding. 
 
Hypothesis 9: The readability of the listing description will increase the likelihood of funding. 
 
Listing title is one of the first pieces of information that a lender searching for listings sees. The title might immediately 
forms a first impression about the whole listing and triggers a lender to either further evaluate the listing or disregard it. A 
sloppy title might lead a lender to consider the borrower as less trustworthy and discourage the lender to consider the listing. 
Conversely, a professional title might attract a lender and leave a good impression. The formality of a title thus might 
increase funding chances. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Formality of titles increases the likelihood of funding. 
 
Like titles, images might form initial impressions about a listing and can be powerful to attract or appall lenders (Steinbrück 
et al. 2002). We therefore hypothesize that images are positively associated with likelihood of funding. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Availability of images increases the likelihood of funding. 
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Control Variables - Profitability, Size, and Duration of the Listing 
We include three control variables: profitability (maximum borrower rate), size (amount requested), and duration of the 
listing. A higher maximum rate a borrower is willing to pay might attract lenders. Based on economic principles, the higher 
the interest rate, the higher the potential profit for lenders. Size of the listing amount might also influence the likelihood of 
funding, because with an average bid amount of $108, larger loans need to attract more total bids than smaller loans, and 
hence more difficult to get funded. In addition, listings that remain open for a longer duration give lenders more time to place 
bid and thus, duration is likely to be associated with higher funding. 
 
In summary, we propose that structural assurances, economic cues, socials cues, and quality influence the perceived 
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The data used for analysis, including listing, bid, and member information are available publicly on Prosper 
(www.prosper.com). Listings included in analysis start from the first listing on Prosper in November 2005 and go to February 
2007. Listings included are either completed, expired, or pending bank or identity verification. These three categories are 
included because they all have a clear final outcome of the listing and bidding behavior – the completed and pending further 
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verification ones run to completion, and expired ones failed to fund in time. Other listings (withdrawn, cancelled, and active) 
are not appropriate to include because the outcomes of active listings are uncertain yet, and the reasons for listings cancelled 
by Prosper or withdrawn by borrower were not clear. As a result, we have 50,223 listings with 752,104 associated bids. Out 
of these, we randomly selected 3000 listings. Since the measure Debt to Income Ratio had 80 missing values, the final 
sample size was 2920. 
 
In order to test the relationships between trust-building mechanisms and trusting behavior, we performed multiple linear 
regression and logistic regression using SPSS 14.0. We tested the influence of 11 independent variables (IV) on 2 dependent 
variables (DV), with 3 control variables (CV) included in the model. Table 2 shows the definitions and types for each 
variable. 
 
Table 2. Description of measures 
Variable Definition Type 
Dependent Variables 
Percentage Funded The percentage amount of the listing which has been funded. This 
can be calculated by dividing amount / amount requested. 
Continuous 
(percentage) 
Listing Completely Funded Whether or not the listing was funded to a 100%. Listings that are 
completely funded will become a loan. 
Categorical (0,1,), 1 = 
Yes 
Independent Variables 
Verified Bank Account Whether or not the borrower has a verified bank account at the 
time the listing was created.  
Categorical (0, 1), 
1=Yes 
Group Membership Whether or not the listing is associated with a group.  Categorical (0, 1), 
1=Yes 
Group Rating The rating of the associated group. If the borrower does not belong 
to any group at the time of the listing, or the group is not rated, 
this value is 0.  
Ordinal (0~5), 
0 is low and 5 is high 




Endorsement Whether or not the borrower who created the listing has 
testimonies from other members. 
Categorical (0, 1), 
1=Yes 
Credit Grade Credit Grade of the borrower at the time the listing was created. If 
there is no report of Credit Grade, the value is 0. 
Ordinal (0~7), 
0 is low and 7 is high 




Homeowner Whether or not the borrower is a verified homeowner at the time 
the listing was created.  
Categorical (0, 1), 
1=Yes 
Flesch Index Indicator of the text readability of the listing description. Continuous (0~100) 
Formality of Title (Starts 
with Upper Letter) 
Indicator of formality of the title of the listing. Categorical (0,1) 
1=Yes 
Has Image Whether or not the borrower has uploaded an image to describe 
the listing. 1=Yes 
Categorical (0, 1) 
Control Variables 
Borrower Maximum Rate The maximum interest rate the borrower is willing to pay when the 
listing was created. 
Continuous 
Duration The number of days in which the listing is valid for.  Continuous 
Amount Requested The monetary amount that the borrower requested to borrow in the 
listing. 
Continuous 
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Results 
Multiple regression was used for dependent variable Percentage Funded. Logistic regression was used for dependent variable 
Listing Completely Funded. Both analyses found significant (p<.05) relationships between 10 out of 14 predictors and the 
dependent variable. The adjusted R-square for Percentage Funded is 40.6%, which means that our model explained 40.6% of 
the variation in Percentage Funded in the sample data. The R-squares for Listing Completely Funded are 35.3% for Cox & 
Snell and 60.2% for Nagelkerke, respectively. Table 3 presents the regression output. 
 
Table 3. Regression output (n.s. = non significant, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001) 
 
Percentage Funded (adj. 
R2 40.6%) 
Listing Completely 
Funded (Cox & Snell R2 
35.3%, Nagelkerke R2 
60.2% ) 
Predictor Variables Beta B 
Verified Bank Account  .224*** 3.417*** 
Credit Grade  .455*** 1.204*** 
Debt To Income Ratio  .019n.s. .000n.s. 
Homeowner  .037* .459* 
Group Membership  .009n.s. .036n.s. 
Group Rating  .079*** .161*** 
Group Leader Reward Rate -.112*** -.420** 
Endorsement  .053*** .494* 
Flesch Index -.005n.s. .001n.s. 
Formality of Title (Starts with Upper Letter)  .042** .819*** 
Has Image  .063*** .671*** 
Borrower Maximum Rate  .287*** .241** 
Duration  .025n.s. .085*** 
Amount Requested -.123*** .000*** 
Conclusion 
Discussion 
The regression results in Table 3 support 7 of the 11 hypotheses about the influence of trust-building mechanisms on trusting 
behaviors. The results of the hypothesis testing are summarized in Table 4. 
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H1 (+) The existence of a verified bank account increases the 
likelihood of funding. 
Supported Supported 
H2 (+) The likelihood of funding increases with higher credit 
grades. 
Supported Supported 
H3 (-) The likelihood of funding decreases with higher debt to 
income ratio. 
Not Supported Not Supported 
H4 (+) Borrower’s homeownership increases the likelihood of 
funding. 
Supported Supported 
H5 (+) Group membership increases the likelihood of funding. Not Supported Not Supported 
H6 (+) The likelihood of funding increases with higher group 
ratings. 
Supported Supported 
H7 (+) The likelihood of funding increases with higher group 
leader reward rates. 
Reversed Reversed 
H8 (+) Endorsements from other community members increase the 
likelihood of funding. 
Supported Supported 
H9 (+) The readability of the listing description will increase the 
likelihood of funding. 
Not Supported Not Supported 
H10 (+) Formality of titles increases the likelihood of funding. Supported Supported 
H11 (+) Availability of images increases the likelihood of funding. Supported Supported 
Hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 11 are supported as previously predicted and discussed. Thus, we found empirical support 
that the presence of a bank account, higher credit grades, homeownership, higher group ratings, endorsements from other 
community members, formality of the listing title, and availability of the images increase the likelihood of funding, a trusting 
behavior. We did not find support for hypotheses 3, 5, and 9. Hence, there is no empirical support for influence of higher debt 
to income ratio, group membership, and description readability on funding on trusting behavior. For hypothesis 7 we 
predicted a positive influence of group reward rate on the likelihood of funding because a higher group leader reward rate 
might be considered by the lender as a signal of credibility. However, the direction of this relationship was reversed in the 
empirical data, i.e., with higher group leader reward rates, the likelihood of funding decreased. To understand this effect, we 
need to understand how the group leaders are paid. The reward rate is subtracted from the lender rate, that is, with higher 
group reward rates, the interests of the lenders decrease. This may explain the negative effect of higher group leader reward 
rates on the likelihood of funding. This effect is conform to the effect of the control variable ‘Maxium Borrower Rate’ – the 
higher the interest a lender is able to get, the higher the likelihood of funding and vice versa. Decreasing profitability of the 
listing thus seems to outweigh the effect of the credibility signal of the group reward rate. 
Limitations 
One limitation of the study is that we were not able to measure trust directly. We investigated the sources of trust and their 
influence on trusting behavior and treated the mechanisms in between as a black box. This means that some of the effects we 
are seeing in the results may not be attributed to trust. We tried to compensate this limitation by including three control 
variables, Borrowers Maximum Rate, Listing Duration, and Amount Requested, to account for some influences not 
accounted for by trust. Moreover, trust building mechanisms and the links with the antecedents and outcomes have been 
widely used and empirically tested (Gefen et al. 2003; Pavlou and Fygension 2006; Pavlou and Gefen 2004), therefore we 
feel confident that the predictors in our model influence trusting behaviors through trust mechanisms. 
 
A second limitation of the study is its reliance on objective and quantitative measures. For example, the formality of listing 
titles is measured by differentiating whether or not the first letter of the title is capitalized; however, the content of the title is 
not included in the formality evaluation. Similarly, the readability score for listing descriptions does not measure content. 
Further analysis looking at the content of listing description, title, and image might be fruitful. 
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Implications and Conclusion 
The primary contribution of our study is to show the importance and influence of trust-building mechanisms in C2C 
marketplaces. Due to the anonymous nature of the Internet, online exchanges are characterized by high risk and uncertainty. 
It is thus important for markets to develop mechanisms that counteract the uncertainties by developing ways to signal 
credibility and providing guarantees and warranties. Especially in C2C marketplaces, it is important for the marketplace to 
provide trust-building mechanisms which enable individuals to differentiate themselves by providing signals of credibility. 
Our study provides empirically support for the influence of trust-building mechanisms on trusting behavior. It shows that it is 
important that e-Finance marketplaces provide structural assurances (e.g., verified bank account), economic cues about the 
individual (e.g., credit grade, homeownership), and social cues derived from the social environment of the borrower (e.g., 
group membership in group with higher ratings and endorsements). The latter one provides support that the community a 
borrower belongs to is important because it may give them reputation and transfers trust from the group to the individual 
borrower. For the individual borrower it is also important to care for the quality of the listing (e.g., formality of the title and 
images). Our findings provide a better understanding of trust behaviors and the mechanisms to develop trust which are 
crucial to businesses that profit from e-Commerce models. 
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